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Abstract: We describe two well-established, practice-based Master’s programmes as examples of 
existing competence development opportunities for practitioners and how such links between the-
ory and practice can be developed and taught within the Higher Education (HE) context. We hy-
pothesise that learning from major failures is essential in linking theory with practice in both engi-
neering and management education. We investigate how to train emergency response teams on 
coping with, and learning from, rare events; a major challenge to other practitioners in the fields of 
safety and risk management. Comparison is undertaken between two disasters—Hurricane Katrina 
in the USA and the relatively recent Grenfell Tower in the UK—using a balanced dual approach of 
paradoxes, a dichotomy. In this paper, we demonstrate the enhancement of both engineering and 
management education. This was achieved through using the two case studies to emphasize the 
relevance of incorporating advanced mental modelling approaches for root cause analysis in train-
ing and by comparing the two cases with respect to the black swan and black elephant concepts. It 
is recommended that future training has a balanced approach that encompasses the outlined fea-
tures of dichotomies. 
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1. Introduction 
Sustainability is a very broad topic that covers virtually every aspect of human en-
deavours, which sometimes makes it difficult to have a single definition. Although not 
limited to these, it covers the management of the natural environment, built environment, 
well-being, raw materials, energy, people and knowledge [1–3]. Therefore, sustainability 
can be defined as a multifaceted endeavour aimed at enhancing the quality of life for peo-
ple without necessarily compromising the integrity of their environments and the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs [4]. While research and practice have con-
tinued to develop and implement useful strategies for preserving most of our most vul-
nerable resources, it is also crucial to note that such strategies cannot be truly sustainable 
without systematizing the ability of humans to learn from failures and successes. In this 
paper, we propose a framework for using a hybrid operational research approach to 
demonstrate learning how to learn from disasters. With a growing focus on linking theory 
with practice more explicitly in postgraduate courses, this paper seeks to explore one way 
that this may be addressed meaningfully. The recent Grenfell Tower Disaster (GTD) in 
London is a stark reminder that, despite the attainment of safety risk management profi-
ciencies that most organisations and countries have achieved, it is still necessary to reflect 
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upon whether safety management systems are adequately learning from previous occur-
rences [5,6]. In the field of disaster risk reduction, learning has been addressed in the lit-
erature from various perspectives. For example, learning through a participatory process 
for the community with respect to flood risk management [7], learning from crisis man-
agement exercises [8,9], learning from natural disasters [10,11] and impacts on supply 
chain resilience [12], learning from disasters and their impacts on middle managers [13] 
and learning from humanitarian logistics for facility locations [14]. 
This paper makes a strong case for the possibility of developing a robust practice-
based safety competence development framework for design engineers, safety regulators, 
operations engineers, process engineers, safety experts, firefighters, maintenance engi-
neers, project engineers, accident investigators, prosecutors and risk and crisis managers 
through the harmonization of techniques currently taught within two Masters pro-
grammes in institutions based in the UK (Reliability Engineering and Asset Management 
(REAM) at the University of Manchester and Risk, Crisis and Resilience Management 
(RCRM) at the University of Portsmouth), into a single framework for continuously learn-
ing from disasters. Before embarking on the core argument and proposal of this paper, it 
is important to remind ourselves that the aftermath of high-visibility accidents [15], such 
as the Piper Alpha oil rig fire [16], Bhopal [17] and Chernobyl [16], are often associated 
with significant casualty tolls, financial losses and loss of community trust in existing or 
possible future initiatives [18–20], which eventually makes learning from disasters and 
crisis management a far more difficult activity. 
An organisational crisis can be defined as an event perceived by managers and stake-
holders as highly salient, unexpected and potentially disruptive [21]. The same authors 
who provided this definition have observed that research in this field remains fragmented 
but can generally be grouped into two primary perspectives: one focussed on the internal 
dynamics of a crisis and the other on managing external stakeholders. Whilst the former 
perspective is internally oriented toward the technical and structural aspects of a crisis, 
the latter perspective is externally oriented toward managing stakeholder relationships. 
Based on these premises, a strong case can be made that a balanced dual approach, in the 
form of a dichotomy (i.e., a division or contrast between two things that are, or are repre-
sented as being, opposed or entirely different), needs to be addressed when training prac-
titioners in risk and crisis management, so as to maintain a “balanced” view of critical 
issues and challenges. By examining two well-established Masters programmes and then 
focusing on an analysis developed to investigate two major incidents as case studies, we 
conclude that training also needs to incorporate not only internal and external factors but 
also quantitative and qualitative analysis, technical and trust issues, and other dualities 
related to learning from disasters. Examples of such dichotomies are learning in both cor-
rective and preventive modes; i.e., learning to mitigate and prevent versus learning from 
analysis and investigation into the aftermath of an incident. Another dichotomy example 
is learning from near misses versus learning from major failures.  
It has long been argued that organizations can vicariously learn from others [22,23]. 
For example, when analysing the Deepwater Horizon disaster, it can be observed that it 
was more similar to the Apollo 13 disaster than to the Exxon Valdez disaster [24], in that 
it involved having to manage systems without human eyes on the scene. Using the same 
theoretical lens, one can also argue that the GTD in London is in many ways similar to the 
Hurricane Katrina Disaster (HKD) and its impact on the community in New Orleans be-
cause it involved social issues and trust between the government and the community. In 
this paper, we focus on comparing GTD with HKD, where both have been analysed using 
engineering failure modelling techniques and methodologies reported by Labib and Read 
[25]. The following section presents research works that are closely related to such dichot-
omies. In presenting the literature, we will try to relate, where possible, our reflection on 
how each aspect of the dichotomy studied can be applied to the GTD, which is the more 
recent case. 
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2. Review of Previous Literature 
Because of the balanced dual approach proposed in this paper, the literature review 
is divided into two parts. The initial part examines literature studies related to internal 
and external perspectives in crisis management, while the latter part deals with dichot-
omy in routines and procedures. 
2.1. Literature Related to Internal and External Perspectives in Crisis Management 
The first perspective by Bundy et al. [21] was labeled as the internal perspective and 
primarily focuses on the within-organization dynamics of managing risk, complexity and 
technology. The significance and relevance of this perspective were also echoed by other 
authors including Bigley and Roberts [26], Gephart et al. [27], Pearson and Clair [28], Per-
row [29] and Starbuck and Milliken [30]. For these scholars, crisis management involves 
the coordination of complex technical and relational systems, as well as the design of or-
ganizational structures to prevent the occurrence of, reduce the impact of and learn from 
crises. In contrast, the second perspective, by Bundy et al. [21], labeled the external per-
spective, focuses on the interactions of organizations and external stakeholders, largely 
drawing from theories of social perception and impression management. According to 
this perspective, crisis management involves shaping perceptions and coordinating with 
stakeholders to prevent, solve and grow from a crisis and the resultant consequences (e.g., 
Bundy and Pfarrer [31]; Coombs [32]; Elsbach [33]; Pfarrer et al. [34]). By further reflecting 
on GTD, the alignment and relevance of both perspectives becomes more intense. For in-
stance, the emerging issues regarding cladding and testing of materials against fire re-
sistance can be associated with the internal perspective, while the issues of trust between 
victims and authorities are external and are the main issues being covered in the GTD 
investigation so far. There is hence a need for more research into approaches that can fa-
cilitate clarity around decision-making by various agencies to increase trust about inter-
vention [35–39] and also clarity about translations into different languages [40]. 
2.2. Literature Related to Dichotomy in Routines and Procedures 
Organizations’ routines have been researched in terms of dichotomies, such as ex-
ploitation of new possibilities and the exploration of old certainties in organizational 
learning [41]. They have also been researched as a dichotomy, or duality, of stability and 
change and compared in terms of their mechanism and outcome [42]. In one instance, 
D’Adderio [43] proposed a dichotomy of (re)framing, in the form of prescribing actions, 
and overflowing, in the form of interpreting rules and procedures. Feldman and Pentland 
[44] on the other hand adapted a taxonomy for routines that was originally conceived by 
Latour [45] in his analysis of power and proposed a dichotomy that shapes routines in 
terms of the ostensive aspect of a routine (which relates to the principal structure) and the 
performative aspect (which relates to its specific contents in terms of practice and imple-
mentation). Levinthal and Rerup [46] studied the categorisation of routines in terms of the 
dichotomy of mindful and less mindful processes and suggested that the ostensive/per-
formative classification is useful for understanding the two processes. There are always 
interactions and interdependent issues in a real and complex situation. Hence, the authors 
who proposed these dichotomies (exploitation and exploration, stability and change, be-
havioural and cognitive, ostensive and performative, concrete and abstract, framing and 
overflowing, mindful and less mindful) have also pointed out that there is a degree of 
feedback, interaction, complementary relationships and recursive relationships between 
the components of these dichotomies. The same applies to knowledge management in 
terms of the dichotomy of tacit and explicit knowledge as proposed by Nonaka and 
Takeuchi [47], as well as the transformation process among and between them.  
In the GTD, there was a clear problem with routines and procedures, based on the 
premise that residents were initially instructed to stay in their apartments during the early 
stages of the fire (which is part of the standard and accepted routine for such buildings). 
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However, now we know that this routine is designed to cope with fires from inside the 
building, rather than fires from outside. We also know that residents who ignored this 
instruction managed to escape the fire. This is quite similar to the case of the Hokuriku 
tunnel train fire that occurred in Japan in 1972, which claimed 30 lives and injured many 
others [48]. On this occasion, the train driver was obeying the regular emergency routines 
that specified that drivers should immediately stop trains once the control panel provides 
an indication of fire in any wagon, in order to minimise cascading effects to other wagons 
due to the effects of wind during train motion. However, we now know that if the driver 
had continued to travel outside the tunnel rather than stopping as per the routine, many 
passengers in other wagons would have survived rather than suffocating in the tunnel. 
This and many other examples show the importance of applying “common sense” or “op-
erational discretion” in conjunction with standard operating procedures, as well as the 
need to understand both the ostensive and performative aspects [49,50]. Such common 
sense has been theorized as “mindfulness” in the literature that relates to high-reliability 
organisations [51] and has also been modeled as a maturity framework [52]. 
Another dichotomy of routines is in the form of reliance on both working and proce-
dural types of memory. Under stress, the human ability to access higher cognitive re-
sources is significantly reduced. This phenomenon was investigated in studying the 
AF447 accident [53], where, despite the existence of a good design and clear recovery pro-
cedures in an Airbus, a degradation in flight automation required increased human cog-
nitive input. This work led to proposing a set of suggestions for pilot training, which fo-
cused on developing core flying skills with less reliance on computers and the technology 
in the cockpit. The same authors agreed with Markman et al. [54] that the influence of 
pressure on task performance indicates that tasks that rely heavily on working memory 
are easily hampered by pressure, while tasks that rely mainly on procedural memory tend 
to be performed better under pressure. 
Research by de Wit and Cruz [53] argues that when recovery procedures are fre-
quently rehearsed, they gradually turn to procedural memories and no longer rely so 
heavily on working memory, and that this effect is greatly enhanced by training under 
pressure. However, we argue that such procedural memory in its extreme becomes a “pro-
grammed” attitude, which may be an obstacle to common sense. In other words, training 
also needs to incorporate cases where one can identify situations where existing routines 
are no longer applicable. 
3. Revisiting Reported Findings and Sequences of Events for the Selected Case Stud-
ies 
Much has been reported with regard to the events that led to the occurrence of our 
case study disasters, including their direct and indirect consequences. However, we think 
it necessary to provide a brief overview for readers to relate more deeply with the failure 
analysis conducted in the subsequent sections. This approach also enables this paper to 
be read as a standalone piece of work. The rationale for selecting the GTD and HKD case 
studies is that they are excellent examples of failure events with some similarities, whilst 
their complexities make them worthy of analysis through the proposed framework. 
As mentioned earlier, this paper makes a case for the possibility of developing a ro-
bust practice-based safety competence development framework for different disciplines 
within both engineering and management fields. Although both case studies are different 
in nature, at a certain level of analysis, there are generic lessons that are common to both 
of them as well as common with other types of disasters. This same argument caused the 
chapters of the work on learning from failures [55] to be organized according to the alpha-
betic order of the cases (hence the term A to Z). This is considered a good practice, rather 
than compiling case studies that belong to a certain discipline or certain decade, as the 
hypothesis was that lessons can be learnt from a generic nature perspective that cuts 
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across different disciplines. Such a multidisciplinary approach in learning from case stud-
ies permits the incorporation of different and balanced views, as well as minimization of 
inclusion of unrealistic assumptions. 
3.1. Case 1: Grenfell Tower Building 
Grenfell Tower is a residential building that was built between 1972 and 1974. It has 
24 storeys containing 120 units of social housing, located within the very affluent Borough 
of Kensington and Chelsea in London (with a staggering average annual income of 
£116,000 and where the average cost of homes is £2 million). Despite the many housing 
units contained in Grenfell Tower, the building design is limited to a single stairwell and 
lacked fire arrest systems such as sprinkler systems. Between 2014 and May 2016, the Ken-
sington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization (KCTMO), through Rydon Con-
struction, performed a significant renovation of the Tower, estimated at approximately £9 
million, to improve its appearance and thermal insulation [56,57]. Some of the major as-
pects of this renovation activity involved the installation of new windows, heating sys-
tems and, most significantly, the installation of aluminium insulation cladding on the ex-
terior of the building, which was made of a flammable material. The decision to install 
relatively flammable aluminum panels, instead of more fire-retardant zinc panels, was 
allegedly motivated by the cost-saving of nearly GBP 300,000 [58]. 
3.1.1. Overview of the GTD Sequence of Events 
According to a report by the World Health Organization (WHO), more than 300,000 
people die from fire-related incidents around the world annually [59,60]. Whilst most of 
those deaths are associated with developing countries where reliable rescue services are 
limited, a significant number of residential fire disasters still occur in advanced econo-
mies. For instance, a study by Jonsson et al. [61] revealed that residential fires account for 
the highest number of fatalities related to fires in Sweden. Similar studies by Mulvaney et 
al. [62] and Tannous et al. [63] reiterated that more than 10 million disability-adjusted life 
years are lost annually to fire-related injuries. In addition to fatalities directly linked to 
residential fires, there is also the risk of additional injuries or deaths that may arise as a 
result of the reconstruction of such buildings, since the construction industry is one of the 
most hazardous industries [64]. While several organizations, as well as the countries in 
which they are domiciled, have made commendable advancements in safety manage-
ment, these worrying statistics show that the journey to self-actualization in health and 
safety is far from complete. 
Because the GTD is relatively recent and investigations are still ongoing, the details 
provided in this article are based on preliminary reports that are available in the public 
domain. Such sources of information are not limited to, but include, the study conducted 
by [56] on the relevance of the disaster for construction project team members. Hayes [65] 
highlighted the importance of noting both pleasant and unpleasant lessons that might 
emerge from the GTD, particularly identifying that man-made disasters do not occur at 
random but instead involve several individual but related failures (i.e., causal relation-
ships). Watt [57] examined the disaster from the viewpoint of avoidable and unacceptable 
health inequalities. Irrespective of the viewpoint, the fundamental teaching from these 
studies is the criticality of collectively learning from such events, including their similari-
ties with previous occurrences, no matter how unpleasant, to create very robust learning 
from disasters framework. 
On June 14th, 2017, at 00:54 am, a faulty fridge-freezer caused a fire in the kitchen of 
a fourth-floor apartment of the Grenfell Tower, triggering several emergency phone calls. 
The first set of fire engines were in attendance within six minutes of the first emergency 
call, and reports specified that it took just 20 min (01:14 am) to get the fire in the kitchen 
under control. However, although the internal fire source was under control, the fire had 
rapidly spread externally, towards the upper side of the building, melting the flammable 
insulation material. In less than thirty minutes, the whole building was on fire. No fire 
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alarm alerted the residents. and at the same time, residents were instructed to remain in-
doors and shut their respective apartments as a part of a standard fire response routine. 
Some residents attempted to defy this instruction and tried to evacuate, but the only stair-
well in the building was filled with thick black smoke, due to a lack of sprinkler systems. 
Two hundred firefighters attended to the fire, which burnt into the next day [56]. 
3.1.2. Overall Analysis of the GTD 
Based on the contents of preliminary reports, including those provided in the works 
of Winstone [56], Hayes [65] and Watt [57], analysis of the disaster revealed the following 
direct consequences: 
 Seventy-two residents died. 
 Whilst there were hundreds of firefighters at the scene of the fire, they were unable 
to save more lives because of access restriction to and from the building (the only 
stairwell was filled with smoke), as well as the speed and intensity of the fire. 
 The reliability and structural integrity of the fire doors within the Tower was un-
known. The residents were legally responsible for fire doors, and only a limited num-
ber had been tested for fire resistance by block managers. 
 There were no sprinkler systems in the building, as they were judged to be too ex-
pensive to install and test (GBP 200,000). 
 There were potential indications of a failed emergency response policy, as residents 
were asked to remain in their apartments. This was further compounded by a com-
bination of fire speed, intensity and lack of functionality of some of the fire doors. 
 There was no functional central fire alarm system in the building. 
 A positive consequence is in terms of health and safety in house building, and ac-
cording to the Social Housing Barometer 2018, “Almost half of housing association 
now place health and safety as a top-five risk” [58]. Therefore, UK housing associa-
tions have increased investments in health and safety and fire risk reduction. How-
ever, there is still a long way to go, as there is evidence of lack of sprinklers in a 
significant number of London high-rise council blocks [66]. 
3.2. Case 2: HKD and Sequence of Events 
HKD occurred between the 24th and 29th of August 2005, the 11th storm of the 2005 
hurricane season. The storm hit the southeast USA around the Gulf of Mexico. During the 
initial stages of the storm on the 24th of August 2005, it was judged to be a Category 3 
storm but later intensified to become a Category 5 storm during the early hours of the 28th 
of August. The hurricane produced a storm surge with waves 6 m above mean seal level, 
heavy rainfall and peak wind speeds of 278 km/hour. On August 26th, the states of Loui-
siana and Mississippi had activated their emergency response plans (ERPs) and imple-
mented coastal evacuation plans. After the evacuation order, approximately 1.2 million 
inhabitants left the area, mostly to states bordering Louisiana. 
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Analysis of the HKD 
Analysis of the disaster, based on several reports [25,67,68], revealed the following 
direct consequences: 
 There were 1100 fatalities reported. 
 The cost of the hurricane was estimated to be $300 billion. 
 The US government provided $50 billion worth of aid, although $1 billion designated 
for victims of the hurricane was lost to fraud. 
 Approximately 1 million people were rendered homeless as a result of damage to 
more than 800,000 housing units. 
 Other impacts of the disaster included heightened vulnerability of people living un-
der unsafe and violent conditions, as well as increased crime rates, which prompted 
the deployment of the US military and National Guard.  
 Oil facilities were damaged, which produced a set of knock-on effects on oil scarcity 
and price hikes in the USA and UK.  
 New Orleans lost most of its defences and could not cope with the hurricane’s im-
pacts. Approximately 80% of the city was immersed in up to 6 m of water.  
 Even after the flood defences were fixed, much of the city remained flooded with 
water for several months after the hurricane because many pump stations were dis-
abled by the storm. 
The HKD was the costliest storm in the history of the USA and one of the most 
deadly. There is a general consensus that the management of the HKD was ineffective and 
disorganized [25].  
4. A Comparative Dichotomy Analysis of HKD Versus GTD 
Studies such as that by Yunusa-kaltungo et al. [69] have been routinely published to 
investigate the causes of accidents and possible means of averting future reoccurrence. 
While these studies generate invaluable contributions to the existing body of literature, 
they are often mono-directional (i.e., solely based on either qualitative or quantitative 
tools). In this section, we demonstrate the significance of developing a “learning from dis-
asters framework” that incorporates both quantitative (engineering) and qualitative (man-
agement) classes, so that safety risk assessors, risk managers, designers and first respond-
ers, particularly firefighters, can better evaluate all facets of the disaster management. In 
order to achieve this, we have selected two groups of tools: fault tree analysis (FTA), reli-
ability block diagram (RBD) and black-swan–black-elephant (BS–BE) analysis. FTA and 
RBD represent the engineering perspective, while BS–BE represents the management per-
spective. 
4.1. Reliability Engineering-Based Models for Learning from Disasters 
FTA is a gradual “top-down” approach for evaluating the causes of failure. It applies 
the principle of deductive logic, whereby an unwanted event (i.e., the “top event”) is sys-
tematically broken down into its elemental causal factors (i.e., “basic events”). In addition 
to generating the root causes of the top event, fault trees (FTs) also use logic gates to depict 
a graphical representation of the causal relationships, which helps analysts understand 
the intricacies of complex failure mechanisms. FT development commences with the se-
lection of the “top event” to be studied (which is often based on the criticality of such 
events), after which the contributing factors are gradually connected to it using logic gates. 
There are several logic gates applicable in typical FTs, such as AND, OR, NOT, k-out-of-
n, exclusive OR, inhibit and priority AND. However, AND and OR gates are the most 
versatile since they can be conveniently used to simplify most real-life systems. Hence, 
only AND and OR gates were used to develop the hierarchical structure of the causal 
factors relating to the case studies examined in the current study. The FTA has been 
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widely used in risk assessment, either on its own or as hybrid with other techniques [70–
72]. 
To better understand the practical applicability of the tool, the FTA in Figures 1 and 
2 are used to depict the similarities between the causal factors that preceded the chosen 
case studies, which enables analysts to examine their similarities, thus learning from fail-
ures (LFF) [73] or learning from the disasters. With the exception of incident-specific basic 
events, such as a1–a8, a10–a11 (for GTD) and b1–b6, b8–b9 (for HKD), this comparison of 
the FTs representing both case studies clearly indicates the existence of significant simi-
larities between several basic events (i.e., a9, a12, a13, b7, b10, b11, b12), particularly those 
associated with evacuation or residents, emergency preparedness and decision-making, 
which further confirms the relevance of the proposed learning from disasters approach.  
 
Figure 1. Grenfell Tower Disaster (GTD) fault tree. 
 
Figure 2. Hurricane Katrina disaster (HKD) fault tree. 
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Because the fault trees for most real-life events often generate very complex struc-
tures that may be difficult to visualize in isolation, the approach adopted here was to con-
vert each FT into an equivalent RBD using the following guiding principles [74] so that 
system vulnerabilities can be more easily visualized: 
 Every “OR” in an FTA is a series configuration in the equivalent RBD. 
 Every “AND” in an FTA is a parallel configuration in the equivalent RBD. 
 Only model basic events, so the number of basic events in an FTA is equal to the 
number of boxes in the RBD. 
 The order in an RBD does not matter. 
The equivalent RBDs shown in Figures 3 and 4 present a very fragile interaction be-
tween the different events, owing to the high number of series connections. Just as in the 
case of FTA, most of the series connections are associated with evacuation of residents 
and emergency response, which make these crucial areas of the study. The RBD analysis 
offers an insight into the vulnerabilities of the system being studied. It can be visualised 
as an advanced version of the classic Swiss Cheese Model (SCM). The simplicity and ele-
gance of the SCM facilitates training about errors and defences and helps to conceptualise 
safety barriers (or the lack of them). However, the SCM has been criticised in terms of its 
way of representing failures; for example, it is not clear how the holes in the cheese line 
up, nor is the relationship between the holes clear. The RBD boxes in parallel, as shown in 
Figure 3, are equivalent to the cheese in the SCM model (safety barriers), and the boxes 
within each branch correspond to the holes within each barrier. Cut sets, which are de-
fined as any group of boxes in the RBD (which, if all occur, will cause the top event in the 
FTA to occur), correspond to the alignment of a ray of light in the SCM model. 
 
Figure 3. GTD equivalent reliability block diagram (RBD). 
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Figure 4. HKD equivalent RBD. 
4.2. Management Based Models for Learning from Disasters 
Prior to the occurrence of GTD in 2017, there had been several instances of flammable 
cladding fires internationally. For instance, similar incidents occurred in Beijing (2009), 
Shanghai (2010), Dubai (2012) and France (2012). It would be expected that this record of 
cladding fire occurrences in several major cities would have provided a risk knowledge 
base, as well as preparation time for risk mitigation. Furthermore, London, Ronan and 
Teeuw [75] had highlighted many fire risks associated with high-rise buildings. However, 
it appears that few lessons were learned from previous incidents or associated publica-
tions. 
While the GTD and HKD cases appear similar with regard to inadequate evacuation 
of residents and emergency response mechanisms, they also possess certain peculiarities 
that can be further explained using the black swan (BS) and black elephant (BE) concepts. 
A study by Taleb [76] provided a simplified but comprehensive means of differentiating 
BS and BE. BS is a term used to describe an event that occurs as a surprise, which is often 
associated with characteristics such as rarity, extreme impact and retrospective predicta-
bility. Conversely, BE signifies a known event that was ignored [76]. Based on these nar-
ratives, HKD and GTD can be respectively represented as BS and BE. Table 1 provides a 
more detailed description of the fundamental characteristics of BS and BE [77–82]. 
Table 1. Summary of similarities and differences between BS and BE. 
Black Swan (BS) Black Elephant (BE) 
High-impact event that is beyond expectation High-impact event that is beyond expectation 
Completely unpredictable except in hindsight 
Many know about it based on existing evidence, but often 
ignored it because everyone is reluctant to deal with it 
Unknown unknowns or beyond hypothetical assumptions Known unknowns 
Unimaginable and only known after the event Imaginable and widely predicted by experts 
Triggers thoughts about theories and key concepts It is an event that changes everything 
Shows severity of crisis 
Shows severity of crisis, as well as necessitates actions that 
often lead to new measures/legislation 
Minimises the sense of threat of unexpected emergency 
events 
Includes perception of facing a major problem 
Despite the high impacts of both events, a combination of the narratives postulated 
by BS–BE and FTA-RBD analyses make it reasonable to classify HKD as unpredictable/un-
imaginable and GTD as predictable but ignored. Such narratives make a significant dif-
ference in the handling of incidents, although it is still very common for field-based ex-
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perts to misconstrue one for the other. In an attempt to better clarify the reason why peo-
ple act differently under BS and BE scenarios, previous studies questioned the ability of 
people to act rationally when confronted by information about risks, particularly those 
with low probabilities of occurrence [79,83]. For instance, events such as the GTD nearly 
always lead to legislation changes and the development of new policies, which is associ-
ated with a need for competency enhancement. It is also crucial to note that not all failures 
refer to disasters. A failure can be managed with a good emergency response plan, good 
preparedness and good crisis management, building resilience. Figure 5 shows the char-
acteristics of BS and BE with regard to expectations and severity assessments, to assist 
policymakers in prioritizing their prevention and emergency response strategies. 
 
Figure 5. Relationship between expectations and severity of events based on black swan (BS) and 
black elephant (BE). 
5. The Need for a Harmonized Case Study Based Learning from Disasters Training 
Approach 
Several studies have indicated that the majority of failure causal factors are directly 
linked to risk management competence, which further emphasizes that the competence, 
attributes, skills and knowledge of designers, engineering failure analysts, prosecutors, 
risk assessors, first respondents, etc., are critical to learning from disasters [16,84,85]. For 
instance, a portion of the independent review report on building regulations and fire 
safety clearly states that “numerous examples have been quoted, demonstrating lack of 
competence among designers, builders, fire engineers, fire consultants, fire risk assessors, 
building control inspectors and others, which compromises the fire safety of build-
ings”[86]. Whilst it is undeniable that organizations are incurring huge expenses in rela-
tion to the professional development of their employees annually, some questions remain 
about how much of these initiatives are converted into field experience. A workplace sur-
vey by Rowden [87] indicated that as much as $230 billion is spent every year on formal, 
informal and on-the-job training, but it remains unclear whether the knowledge acquired 
is adequately connected to the context of professional practices. This is something that 
both Masters programmes considered below actively seek to address. 
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In this section, we present two examples of existing Masters programmes that the co-
authors of this study are involved with. The first focuses on risk, crisis and resilience man-
agement (RCRM), while the second relates to reliability engineering and asset manage-
ment (REAM). In the RCRM programme, the underlying theory of “learning loops” is 
embedded within each session, which aims to support the approach described by several 
authors [15,88] in their study of teaching accident causation and prevention. In doing so, 
we provide a demonstration of how training and development can be implemented in a 
more systematic approach through the provision of work-based training schemes as pro-
posed by Becher [89] and operationalizing “learning how to learn” as proposed by Whit-
ston [90]. 
The fulcrum of the RCRM course is the conversion of theory to practice. Case study 
learning is embedded within every module, highlighting the multi-disciplinary nature of 
risk. This allows students to deeply reflect on the causes of failure and consider best prac-
tices, as well as identify lessons learned for future resilience [91–95]. The diversity of the 
student cohort, with regard to the level of industrial experience and discipline (e.g., emer-
gency services, military, oil and gas, financial services, project management, engineering, 
general consulting, healthcare), offers many opportunities for simulating real-life crisis 
scenarios. During the programme, students perform role-plays based on a multiple case 
study approach, managing a given “crisis” as it unfolds from the perspective of the roles 
they have assumed. The choice of case studies is often driven by the severity of the event 
and contemporaneity, exposing the students to multiple perspectives [96]. Typical exam-
ples of such pairs include: 
 Piper Alpha, and Deepwater Horizon (oil and gas) 
 Air France AF447 and German Wings (aviation) 
 VW Emissions Crisis and Toyota Recalls (car manufacturing) 
 Three Mile Island and Fukushima (nuclear power generation) 
Although the REAM programme is more directed towards creating engineering so-
lutions, its structure, teaching approach and cohort diversity are very similar to RCRM, 
which makes harmonization very realistic. Techniques such as failure modes effects anal-
ysis (FMEA), reliability-centred maintenance (RCM), FTA, RBD and condition-based 
maintenance (CBM) that provide useful insight into Engineering Failure Analysis (EFA) 
are at its core. In our proposed style of dichotomy analysis, we believe that in an ideal 
world, practitioners should be familiar with the main contents from the disciplines of 
management and engineering, in order to create a balance between qualitative and quan-
titative analysis [23,83,97,98].  
6. Discussion and Major Lessons Learned 
Here we discuss major lessons learnt in Higher Education at strategic and operational 
levels. In this era of dynamism and uncertainty, strategic-level decisions that encompass 
robust practical knowledge of reliability engineering and crisis management are becom-
ing increasingly important for preventing, and in extreme cases minimizing, the conse-
quences of system failures. Hence, an important balance in designing Masters pro-
grammes should be geared towards achieving such a balance of a set of dichotomies in 
terms of engineering and management, technical and social, quantitative and qualitative, 
and positivist and interpretivist approaches, and emphasis on both single-loop and dou-
ble-loop learning. In general, both success and failure offer good lessons for continuous 
improvement within all disciplines [36–39,73], although most conventional teachings are 
more inclined towards emphasizing the significance of learning from organizational suc-
cesses [99,100]. However, some studies [101–103] are shifting this paradigm through their 
argument that the consequences of failures (especially catastrophic failures) are more 
likely to linger far longer than those of success, which eventually sets the framework that 
breeds experiential learning [25,55,104]. We also argue that a balance between a relatively 
recent case study and an older one provides a good balance in terms of learning. On the 
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one hand, the recent cases tend to be more relevant and timely, but there are uncertainties 
about factual evidence as new evidence may appear later. On the other hand, older case 
studies have the advantage of being “classical cases” where the dust has settled; hence, 
generic lessons can be clearly demonstrated using the proposed techniques in a convinc-
ing argument. 
At an operational level, this paper has reviewed, compared and discussed the Hurri-
cane Katrina and Grenfell Tower case studies. Both disasters are complex events that re-
quire multi-disciplinary analyses from several teams and organizations. In both cases, 
prevention and preparedness are crucial steps that offer cost-effective means of incident 
control. Through a combination of reliability engineering and crisis management tools 
such as FTA, RBD and BS–BE, this study shows the feasibility of creating generic learning 
from a disasters framework that can serve as a training resource for a diverse range of 
field-based experts. Despite the existence of some event-specific failures, it is clear that the 
most significant failures for both case studies are similar, relating to the evacuation of 
residents and emergency response. The specifics of these failure points as related to the 
case studies are summarized below.  
6.1. Evacuation of Residents 
Owing to the lack of fire alarms within Grenfell Tower, some of the residents had to 
call the emergency services to ask what they should do. Preliminary reports and testimo-
nies show that residents were told to stay inside their flats and wait for the firefighters to 
rescue them. In the UK, this is a standard policy for fires in high-rise tower blocks such as 
Grenfell Tower. However, a combination of refurbishment using flammable materials, as 
well as the occurrence cladding-related high-rise building fires elsewhere, should have 
triggered a modification of the evacuation policy for Grenfell Tower. Similarly, evacuation 
during HKD was a very slow process, such that as many as 100,000 inhabitants were not 
evacuated. This group comprised mainly the most vulnerable and poor who had no 
means of self-transportation. 
6.2. Emergency Response 
In the case of GTD, we appreciate that residents were not prepared to evacuate the 
building and no training was given regarding evacuation in that context. The dual effects 
of a single stairwell and the lack of sprinkler systems in the building led to the accumula-
tion of black smoke along the only escape route. Some of the complaints from firefighters 
were that they did not know what to do under such a peculiar case of rapid cladding-
fueled combustion, as they had never been trained under such scenarios. The fast-spread-
ing fires in residential buildings with external combustible cladding are a challenge for 
emergency services, fire brigades and crisis management teams and require updated con-
tingency plans and updated training. 
6.3. Unlearning from Failures 
When one examines fire disasters in towers and the issues of cladding, and the “stay-
put” routine, it is clear that GTD demonstrates that the “unlearning from failures process” 
[105,106] has occurred here as well. According to a BBC documentary, “On 14 June 2017, 
televisions across the country showed a west London tower block burn. For some, this 
was history repeating itself—as if five similar fires had simply not been important enough 
to prevent the deaths of 72 people in Grenfell Tower” [107]. 
The five similar fire incidents related to towers in the UK are listed below: 
 Summerland—1973—Douglas, Isle of Man 
 Knowsleys Heights—1991—Liverpool 
 Garnock Court—1999—Scotland—clad for decorative reasons 
 Harrow Court—2005—Stevenage 
 Lakanal House—2009—Camberwell/South London 
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The following list summarizes relevant recommendations after enquiries: 
a. After incident 1 (1973)—Recommendation: installation of sprinklers in all buildings. 
b. Between incidents 1 and 2 (1973–1991, Margaret Thatcher’s government): 
 Reduced Fire Regulations from 300 pages to only 18 pages.  
 Produced Approved Document B in the UK Fire Regulations: after this, cladding 
in buildings did not have to be fireproof. 
c. After incident 3 (1999)—Recommendation: no use of cladding flammable material in 
high-rise blocks: 
 Committee Final Report: decided that Approved Document B was sufficient. 
 Fitting sprinklers in all high-rise accommodation buildings was rejected.  
 The stay-put policy was rejected. 
d. Between incidents 4 and 5 (2005–2009): Approved Document B was amended in 2006, 
allowing combustion tests of cladding materials. 
e. After incident 5 (2009): 
 Recommended that sprinkler systems be fitted. 
 Revision of Approved Document B. 
 Revision of the stay-put policy. 
It is clear from the above-mentioned list of incident cases and recommendations that 
the standard policy of “stay put” needs to be fundamentally revisited, and that there is a 
clear need to investigate changes and amendments in laws and regulations, such as Ap-
proved Document B, which is clearly an “elephant-in-the-room” case. These two case 
studies, coupled with the theoretical underpinning of the black elephant and black swan 
phenomena, and using two techniques for root case analysis and assessment of vulnera-
bilities in the system, have demonstrated how they can be embedded in Masters training 
programmes that are targeted towards practitioners involved in the fields of safety and 
risk management. 
7. Conclusions 
Major events such as Grenfell Tower and Hurricane Katrina disasters provide major 
opportunities for learning from disasters, especially with regard to investigation and im-
provement. In this paper, we have discussed the causes of both disasters, with evidence 
from reports showing that the most crucial failure points can be attributed to evacuation 
and emergency response activities. The existing body of knowledge indicates that the 
most dominant approach to failure investigation and crisis management within the indus-
try creates a dichotomy, by either separately focusing on core engineering or core man-
agement failures, which we have found to be an obstruction to effective learning. Through 
a combination of reliability engineering and crisis management concepts, we examined 
the similarities and differences between the two case studies in an attempt to develop a 
harmonized practice-based learning framework for designers, failure analysts, and first 
responders, as well as risk and crisis managers.  
Graphical representation tools such as FTA, RBD and BS–BE, which cross over be-
tween various facets of engineering and management fields, provide a platform for better 
and faster analysis, which in turn enables policymakers and crisis management teams to 
deliver crucial decisions within the shortest possible time. In addition, they act like a men-
tal visual model that summarises, and better presents, many pages of narratives, which is 
often a common feature in many incidents enquiry reports. Besides the ease of application 
of the tools combined in this study, it is believed that this fusion could potentially enhance 
the lead time for response during crisis because investigation and risk evaluation activities 
often account for significant amounts of decision-making time. These two case studies 
emphasize the need for a more divergent approach to incident investigation and general 
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crisis management, especially when they involve a low probability of occurrence events. 
It is hoped that the findings of this study will help shift the paradigm of competence de-
velopment in failure investigation and crisis management. 
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